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INCENTIVES FOR SURVEY PARTICIPATION:
RESEARCH ON INTENDED AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES *)
SECOND ANNUAL WILDENMANN LECTURE
Eleanor Singer
 am honored to have been invited to give the second Rudolph Wildenmann lecture,
following in the distinguished footsteps of Norman Bradburn last year. Although the
topic of my talk is perhaps a little specialized, it is in the spirit of empirical social re-
search, especially survey research, which Professor Wildenmann did so much to foster.
As you all know, sample surveys are increasingly used by government and the private
sector to inform policy decisions in a wide variety of areas. They are also indispensable
for theory building and theory testing in the social sciences.
But while reliance on the products of survey research is growing, the difficulty of ob-
taining cooperation with sample households in the United States and other developed
countries is increasing as well (de Heer and Israëls, 1992). Even though the overall
response rates of surveys may be relatively constant over time (Smith, 1995), the compo-
nent of nonresponse due to refusals appears to be increasing unless efforts by survey
organizations are substantially increased (Groves and Couper, 1996).
One of the strategies increasingly being used by survey organizations is the payment of
monetary incentives. But payment of such incentives, either at the outset of the survey or
in an effort to convert refusals later, raises a variety of long-term issues for survey
organizations.
Shortly before I came to the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan
in the fall of 1994, Professor James House, the Director of the Survey Research Center,
asked Bob Groves and me to organize a research seminar that would discuss some of
these issues. Following presentations by four distinguished speakers, including Barbara
Bryant, a former director of the U.S. Census Bureau, and Tom Juster, an economist and
I
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Senior Research Scientist at ISR, several of us met in an effort to formulate guidelines
for an SRC policy on the payment of incentives to respondents. One of the few things the
panel agreed on was the need for continued research, both on the effects of incentives
and on public perceptions of, and reactions to, them.
Today's talk is about what I think we have learned since then about the role of incentives
in motivating survey participation, at least in the United States. It remains to be seen
whether the findings will generalize to other countries, with different traditions and dif-
ferent social norms. My hope is that this talk will stimulate a similar program of
research at ZUMA, and elsewhere.
I apologize that this talk is in English rather than in German. But I am going to try to tell
you a story with pictures, and those of you who are interested can read the lecture at your
leisure. The lecture has three parts:
1. First, it reviews what is known about the effect of incentives on response rates in
mail surveys, and describes recent research on how they affect face-to-face and
telephone surveys.
2. Second, it discusses issues of equity that arise in connection with refusal conversion
payments, and reviews recent research on how respondents perceive such issues and
whether or not these perceptions affect their willingness to participate.
3. Third, it describes some empirical evidence on whether or not the payment of mone-
tary incentives is having long-term effects on the motivation for survey participation.
Another way of stating this is to say that the lecture deals with intended and unintended
consequences of paying incentives to respondents.
From the outset, I want to make it clear that I will be talking about a program of research
involving the collaboration of many people, in particular my colleagues Bob Groves,
Trivellore Raghunathan, John Van Hoewyk, and my research assistant, Amy Corning.
The National Science Foundation and the Survey Research Center have provided
indispensable financial support.
What Do We Know about How Incentives Work?
Effects in Mail Surveys
From a meta analysis of the effect of incentives on mail survey response rates (Church,
1993) we know that:
1) Prepaid incentives yield higher response rates than promised incentives;
2) Prepaid monetary incentives yield higher response rates than gifts;
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3) Response rates increase with increasing amounts of money, although not all studies
find a linear relationship;
4) Incentives promised after return of the questionnaire do not significantly increase
response.
Effects in Telephone and Face-to-Face Surveys
1)
Initial incentives--that is, incentives offered to all respondents at the outset of a survey--
are also being used increasingly in telephone and face-to-face surveys, but we know
much less about their effectiveness in these modes. Comparison of the respondent's
situation in mail and interviewer-mediated surveys suggests that, other things being
equal, the need for a monetary incentive should be greater in mail surveys. This
conclusion is based on the persuasive value generally attributed to the interviewer, as
well as on the fact that the presence of an interviewer lessens the respondent's burden in
completing the questionnaire. Thus, it seemed possible that the significantly positive
effects of incentives documented for mail surveys would not be found in the case of
interviewer-mediated surveys.
Nancy Gebler, John Van Hoewyk, Trivellore Raghunathan, Kate McGonagle and I
brought together and quantitatively analyzed all the experimental studies we could locate
(as of 1997) which used incentives in face-to-face and telephone surveys--37 studies in
all--each containing two, and sometimes more, experimental conditions (Singer et al.,
forthcoming). We attempted to answer four basic questions:
· Do incentives improve response rates in telephone and face-to-face surveys? By how
much?
· Are prepaid incentives more effective than promised incentives?
· Is money more effective than a gift?
· What is the effect of burden?
For each experimental condition in each of the 37 studies, the following independent
variables were coded:
· Amount of incentive
· Type of incentive (gift or money)
· Timing of incentive (paid before interview taken, or promised)
· Burden (coded as high if interview was longer than an hour or if any of the following
were present: diary, test, sensitive questions, panel study; otherwise coded as low)
The dependent variable was the difference in response rates between the zero incentive
condition (or the lowest incentive condition) and each higher incentive condition in the
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same experiment. So, for example, if a study had three experimental conditions--a zero-
incentive condition, a $5 incentive, and a $10 incentive--we computed two dependent
variables for that experiment: the difference in response rate between the zero-incentive
and the $5 condition, and the difference between the zero-incentive and the $10 con-
dition. These differences were weighted by the inverse of the variance of the response
rate difference in the analysis.
In order to eliminate confounding due to differential cooperation tendencies, we intro-
duced a covariate which we call "panel status" into all the analyses reported below.
Panel status simply refers to whether the subjects in the experiment were new
respondents, nonrespondents to the current or a prior wave, or respondents to a previous
wave. Most of the experiments were carried out with respondents who had not
previously been approached for an interview. Because these variables were not
significant in any of the models, we did not include them in the final models shown.
Similarly, we included mode of administration as a control variable, but trimmed it from
the models when it failed to show significant effects.
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1. The first model shown in Table 1 com-
pares one or more incentive conditions with a zero incentive condition in the same
experiment. The model controls for type of incentive, timing of incentive, amount of
incentive, and burden. As can be seen from Model 1, paying an incentive has a
significant positive effect with these other variables controlled. As in the study by Yu
and Cooper (1983) and Church (1993), the effects of incentives are linear; a term for the
square of the incentive difference, introduced to test for curvilinearity, was not
significant. Within the limits of incentives and response rates occurring in these
experiments, more money results in higher response rates.
The difference in response rates produced by prepayment vs. promised payment is not
significant in this model, but the direction of the differences is in accord with conven-
tional wisdom--i.e., prepayment appears to be more effective than promised payments.
When we look only at the five experiments that hold size of incentive constant and com-
pare prepayment and promised payment directly, we find in every case that prepayment
yields higher response rates than the promised payment condition. However, unlike
Church (1993) but like Yu and Cooper (1983), we found a significant improvement in
response rates with promised as well as prepaid incentives (data not shown).
Like Church (1993), we found that gifts are significantly less effective in eliciting
response, even controlling for the value of the incentive. Increasing the burden of the
interview significantly increased the difference in response rates between a zero
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incentive and an incentive condition. The interaction between burden and the size of the
incentive was not significant, however.
Are incentives necessary in low-burden telephone or face-to-face interviews? We cannot
answer the question in that form, but we can ask whether incentives have a significant
effect on response rates in such interviews. Restricting the analysis above to low-burden
conditions, we find that the effect of incentives remains significant (b=0.5865,
S.E=0.2144, p<.05).
The second model in Table 1 includes, in addition to experiments with a zero-incentive
condition, all those that compare the smallest with larger incentive conditions as well.
These results parallel those shown in Model 1, except that here the effect of prepayment
is not only positive but also significant. The effect of gifts is significantly negative
(compared with cash), and the effects of burden are as described for Model 1.
Table 1: Effects of Incentive Amount, Time of Payment, Type of
Incentive and Burden on Differences in Response Rate
Model 1 Model 2
Zero vs. Larger Incentive
Conditions
Smallest vs. Larger Incentive
Conditions
Beta Standard Error Beta Standard Error
Intercept 1.7852 1.2808 1.4492 1.2785
Incentive
difference/dollara
0.1479 0.0479*** 0.1443 0.0481***
Prepayment 0.4599 2.0293 2.4462 1.5066*
Gift -4.9357 2.1360** -7.1428 1.4257***
Burden 3.2866 1.3308** 3.9550 1.2289***
Adj. R2 . 36 .41
N (55) (59)
a „Incentive difference“ refers to the difference between the smallest (or zero) incentive and larger
incentive amounts paid. Incentive amounts are modeled in constant 1983 dollars.
* p = .11,  ** p < .05, ***p < .01
Because some studies contributed more than one pair of conditions to the analysis, we
reran these analyses using a random effects model with studies as random blocks. The
parameter estimates are very similar to those in models that do not control for study, and
the effects of all the independent variables except prepayment remain significant in
these models.
As far as we can tell from the studies we examined, incentives do not appear to exact a
price in quality (i.e., item nonresponse or number of words in response to open-ended
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questions). Paying an incentive may alter the composition of the sample, however. In
four studies, there is an indication that paying an incentive may be useful in obtaining
higher numbers of respondents in demographic categories that might otherwise tend to
be underrepresented in sample surveys (e.g., low income or nonwhite race). Six other
studies reported no significant effects of incentives on sample composition, and in one
study the results were mixed.
Does $10 Equal $10? The Effects of Framing on the Effectiveness of Incentives
The theoretical literature on the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Cialdini, 1988)
suggests that framing an appeal in such a way as to evoke a sense of diffuse obligation
will result in higher response rates than framing it as payment for the respondent's time.
The difference can, perhaps, also be thought of as a Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft orien-
tation (Toennies, 1955). The former is a reflection of a community of interests; the latter
fosters a rational calculation of benefits and costs.
The question we addressed in the study I am about to describe is whether this theoretical
principle depends on the type of incentive offered (Singer, Gebler, Van Hoewyk, and
Brown, 1997). That is, we hypothesize that the use of a monetary incentive renders an
appeal to reciprocity less effective, and that the use of a gift renders it more effective. In
other words, we hypothesize that certain types of appeals are congruent only with certain
types of incentives, and that they are less effective when this natural congruity is
violated.
In order to test this hypothesis, we designed an experiment in which two types of incen-
tives (a pen valued at $3.75, and a check for $10) were randomly paired with two dif-
ferent types of appeals.
One letter described the incentive as a "token of our appreciation"; the other referred to
the incentive as "payment for your time." A random half of the group receiving each type
of incentive received the "token" letter, the other half received the "payment" letter.
Aside from the definition of the incentive as a token of appreciation or as payment, the
two letters were identical in describing the content of the study (how to make surveys
more effective), its sponsor (the University), and the organization carrying it out (the
Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan). We predicted that describing a
pen as a "token of appreciation for your help" would be perceived as an appeal to the
norm of reciprocity, and would be more effective in eliciting agreement to participate in
the study than a pen described as "payment for your time." Similarly, we predicted that a
check for $10 described as "payment for your time" would be more effective in eliciting
agreement to participate than a check for $10 framed as "a token of our appreciation."
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Since most monetary incentives in face-to-face and telephone surveys are framed as
promised rather than prepaid incentives, we also included a condition in which the $10
check was described as a payment but promised to the respondent rather than sent ahead
of time, so that we would be able to distinguish the effects of prepayment from the
effects of appropriate framing. 125 undergraduates from the University of Michigan
were randomly assigned to each of the five conditions.
Students were mailed a letter asking them to participate in a telephone survey being
conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan about how to
improve survey practices. The survey was described as taking 45 minutes, and students
were asked to return a card indicating their willingness to be interviewed. All students
(both those who returned the card and those who did not) were followed up with a brief
telephone interview. The questionnaires differed slightly between the two groups, but
both contained similar sets of questions about their attitudes toward surveys and incen-
tives and their reasons for returning or failing to return the card.
Looking only at those who returned a card indicating their willingness to be interviewed
supported our framing hypothesis for money, but not for gifts (see Table 2, Column 1).2)
As in other reviews of the role of incentives in mail as well as telephone and face-to-face
surveys (Church, 1993; Singer et al., forthcoming; Yu and Cooper, 1983), we found that
money is significantly more effective than a gift (57.6% vs. 32.0%; X2=32.1, df=1,
p<.01), and promised payment is significantly less effective than a prepaid monetary
incentive (44.8% vs. 57.6%; X2=8.52, df=1, p<.01).3)
As predicted, framing a check as payment is significantly more effective than framing it
as a token of appreciation (64.0% vs. 51.2%; X2=6.54, df=1, p<.05), but there is no
"boomerang" effect when a pen is framed as "payment" for time--perhaps because the
incentive effect associated with the pen is so small.
As already noted, this conclusion is based on those expressing a willingness to
participate by returning a card. In fact, however, we attempted to interview everyone in
the sample, regardless of whether or not they had mailed back the card. Response rate to
the survey can be seen as a measure of how firm the decision to participate or refuse,
represented by mailing back the card, actually is.
Among those who had returned a card signifying willingness to participate, the response
rate to the actual survey was 92%, indicating that mailing the card constitutes a high, but
not perfect, commitment to complete the interview. But even among those who had not
returned the card, 69% were ultimately interviewed.4) Thus, the negative commitment
signified by failure to return the card is not very firm; persuasive interviewers can over-
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come it in a large majority of potential respondents. We should note once again that
these findings are based on a student sample, notoriously more cooperative than a
general population sample, and that everyone in the sample either had received (80%) or
was promised (20%) some kind of incentive.
The actual survey response rates, by experimental condition, are shown in Table 2,
Column 2. Note that these cannot be taken as a pure measure of incentive effectiveness,
since the incentive is, in every case, augmented by one or more contacts with an inter-
viewer. Thus, Column 2 illustrates the additive and interactive effects of interviewers
and different kinds of incentives. In the case of some of the experimental conditions, this
"added value" is very large indeed: more than forty percentage points in the case of the
pen incentive conditions and almost forty percentage points in the promised money con-
dition.5)
Table 2: Agreement to Be Interviewed and Actual Response Rates,
by Experimental Condition
(1) (2)
Experimental Condition Agreement to Be Response Rate (N)
Interviewed
% % N
Pen as a token of appreciation 30.4 76.0 125
Pen as payment for time 33.6 75.2 125
$10 check as token of appreciation 51.2 79.2 125
$10 check as payment for time 64.0 81.6 125
$10 check as payment, promised 44.8 84.0 125
However, it is not simply true that the response rates after follow-up are higher than
those without interviewer intervention. The conclusions one would draw about the
relative effectiveness of different incentives also differ. None of the differences between
conditions is significant after the calls by interviewers. Not only is there no support for
the framing hypothesis when only the results of the actual survey are considered, but
there is no support for the effects of cash vs. gifts or prepaid vs. promised incentives.
Because these results are based on an experiment with students, and because of several
other ambiguities, including the absence of a control group, we are in the process of
repeating this experiment with a national sample of telephone households for whom we
were able to obtain a listed address. So far, the results resemble the results for the
student sample before interviewer followup, except that the response rates, as one would
expect, are significantly lower.
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Does Equity Matter? And to Whom?
So far, we have been looking at research on intended consequences of incentives. I turn
now to some experiments involving unintended consequences.
There are two opposing views on the issue of paying refusal conversion payments to
reluctant respondents. On one side are the economists, naive or otherwise, who argue
that refusal is an ipso facto indication that the survey has less utility for the refusers, or
is perceived as more burdensome by them. This being the case, it is seen as entirely
appropriate to offer compensation to refusers but not to other respondents, who are more
cooperative.
On the other side of the argument are the social psychologists, for whom refusal conver-
sion payments represent a violation of equity expectations. For the social psychologists,
reluctance to participate is not an ipso facto indication that the survey is more burden-
some; and offering refusal conversion payments to reluctant respondents seems likely to
reinforce their uncooperative behavior, making it more likely to recur in the future. In
addition, such payments are believed likely to alienate cooperative respondents if they
should become aware of the practice.
In the traditional formulations of equity theory (e.g. Adams, 1965; Adams and
Freedman, 1976; Walster, Berscheid and Walster, 1976; Walster, Walster, and
Berscheid, 1978; Homans, 1961, 1974), perceptions of equity are determined by the
results of a comparison such as the following:
Ego’s Input
Ego’s Reward
 =  
Alter’s Input
Alter’s Reward
If the two ratios are similar, the outcome of the comparison is perceived as equitable.
But if Alter is seen as differentially rewarded for a task similar to that performed by
Ego, then the situation is likely to be perceived as inequitable, provided that the other
person is seen as "similar" to Ego. Thus, offering incentives to respondents who have
refused a prior survey request may be perceived as inequitable by those who have agreed
to participate without such an incentive. Others, however, may not be defined as similar,
or the task they perform may be seen as dissimilar. For example, potential respondents
may recognize that although they are motivated to respond by altruistic concerns, others
are not so motivated, and it is therefore appropriate to provide greater incentives to those
others. Or, potential respondents may judge that the task is harder for reluctant
respondents, and that it is therefore appropriate to offer greater incentives to them.
Under those circumstances, if other respondents are not seen as similar, then reference
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group theory (Hyman, 1942; Stouffer et al., 1949; Merton and Rossi, 1950; Hyman and
Singer, 1968), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and social comparison
theory (Suls and Miller, 1977) all predict that they will cease to be defined as an
appropriate object of comparison, and differences between Ego's reward and Alter's will
cease to motivate Ego's behavior (Suls and Miller, 1977; Singer, 1981; Shepelak and
Alwin, 1986).
If an expectation exists concerning appropriate rewards for survey participation, then it
is reasonable to assume that a violation of that expectation by the survey organization
will lead to a perception of inequitable treatment by the respondent. In turn, such a
perception may lead to reluctant participation or outright refusal.6)
Focus Groups
To explore potential respondents' reactions to equity issues involved in the payment of
incentives, we held two exploratory focus group discussions in the fall of 1994. One
consisted of black low-income participants, all but two women, in Detroit; the other, of
middle-class, mostly white, men and women in Livonia, a suburb of Detroit.
Respondents were recruited by Survey Research Center interviewing supervisors and
promised $15 for their participation.
These group discussions offered little evidence for widespread perceptions of inequity in
survey organizations' incentive practices. But to provide better answers to this question,
Bob Groves and I designed a study that relied in part on laboratory administration of
videotaped vignettes of survey interactions and in part on a field experiment in the 1996
Detroit Area Study (Groves et al., 1997).
The Videotaped Vignette Study
The vignettes were constructed from three completely crossed factors: disclosure of
differential incentives (vs. no disclosure), burden (high vs. low), and traditional per-
suasion (no prior refusal vs. prior refusal). In addition, we included two other factors
that were only partially balanced within the design: a rationale for differential incentives
in the disclosure condition (vs. no rationale), and an initial incentive (vs. no incentive).
The result was 12 distinct vignettes, having the characteristics shown in Figure 1. These
were videotaped, using one interviewer throughout, a second interviewer when a refusal
conversion was involved, a female subject's voice, and a male subject's voice. Ninety-six
subjects were recruited through the Parent-Teacher Organizations of two local
elementary schools to which we made a cash contribution; subjects were not paid
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individually. They were interviewed a week or so before viewing the videos with a
questionnaire that asked about their political attitudes and community involvement, as
well as about their attitudes toward surveys and their sensitivity to equity issues. Each
subject viewed a randomly selected set of six vignettes and completed a brief self-
administered questionnaire after seeing each one. The questionnaires included some
manipulation checks along with the main dependent variable: "Would you be willing to
take part in this interview?" Following the last video, they also completed a "final
debriefing questionnaire" which repeated a few of the questions from the intake
interview, primarily those about their perception of the fairness of differential payments
to survey respondents.
Figure 1: Subject Counts by Experimental Factors
No Incentive
Low Burden High Burden
No Prior
Refusal
Prior
Refusal
No Prior
Refusal
Prior
Refusal
No Disclosure 48 48 48 48
Disclosure, No Rationale 48 48 48 48
Disclosure, Rationale 48 X 48 X
Incentive
Low Burden High Burden
No Prior
Refusal
Prior
Refusal
No Prior
Refusal
Prior
Refusal
No Disclosure 48 X 48 X
Disclosure, No Rationale X X X X
Disclosure, Rationale X X X X
The analysis controls for order-of-administration effects (not significant) as well as mode
effects (25 subjects responded to written, rather than videotaped, versions of the
vignettes). Although we also entered demographic and attitudinal variables into the
logistic regressions, only one of these produced a significant effect, either alone or in
interaction with the experimental variables, and is retained in the final model. The
results of the final analysis, which was run in SUDAAN to adjust for multiple
observations on the same respondent, are shown in Table 3.
The table shows some obvious things and some that are less obvious:
1. In the first place, interviews described as requiring an hour and a half are
significantly less likely to elicit a willingness to respond than those described as
requiring only half an hour.
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2. Interviews described as offering an incentive ahead of time significantly increase the
expressed willingness to respond.
3. Showing a vignette in which a respondent refuses twice, and is solicited three times
by two different interviewers, reduces the expressed willingness to respond, as we
had hypothesized; the effect is significant at the zero-order level at p=.09.
4. Subjects answering the written, rather than the videotaped, versions of the vignettes
are less likely to express their willingness to respond, perhaps because of the
absence of social desirability or identification factors, but there are no significant
mode by independent variable interactions.
5. Subjects who believe respondents should be paid for survey participation were less
likely to express a willingness to respond.
6. Finally, and most important from the point of view of equity theory, disclosure of
differential incentives being paid to some but not all respondents significantly
reduces subjects' expressed willingness to respond. However, if the vignette contains
a rationale for why differential payments are necessary, the negative effect of
disclosure is much reduced.
Table 3: Logistic Regression Coefficients for Model Predicting High
Likelihood of Participation 1)
Coefficient Standard
Error
Intercept
Predictors
Incentive
Burden
Disclosure, Rationale Conditions:
   No Disclosure2)
   Disclosure, No Rationale
   Disclosure, Rationale
Refusal
Mode
Compensation
.11
.94**
-.58*
---
-.59**
-.25
-.49
-.75*
-.85*
.28
.27
.26
.18
.23
.32
.37
.40
1) Standard errors reflect the clustering of observations within subjects. The dependent variable is coded 0 (for
responses 1, 2, 3) and 1 (for responses 4, 5). The Acompensation@  variable is coded A1" for Astrongly agree@  or
Asomewhat agree@  and A0", otherwise. Asterisks denote p-values: * - p<.05, ** - p<.01.
2) Omitted category in dummy variable regression.
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Not shown in Table 3, but of interest nevertheless, is the fact that there is no
independent or interactive contribution of a measure of perceived fairness on expressed
willingness to participate. That is, although about 80% of subjects consider the paying of
differential incentives unfair (unless justified by greater importance of the information or
a longer interview), this attitudinal measure does not increase our ability to predict their
willingness to participate in a survey in which differential incentives are being paid.
Furthermore, the percentage of those considering the practice unfair declines somewhat
from intake to debriefing interview.
The Field Experiment
Because the vignette study was carried out in the laboratory with a rather homogeneous
sample (most respondents were white married women with young children, members of
two Parent-Teacher Organizations in Ann Arbor who had been recruited through the
promise of a contribution of $200 to the PTO), we designed a field experiment that, we
hoped, would provide better external validity for these findings.
The vehicle for this investigation of the role of perceptions of equity in survey response
was the Detroit Area Study (DAS), established by the University of Michigan over 40
years ago as a research and training laboratory in the community. The 1996 DAS was
intended as a study of interracial contacts and attitudes, but the survey was also designed
to permit an investigation of hypotheses concerning perceptions of equity in relation to
the payment of incentives.
The 1996 DAS consisted of an area probability sample of 451 households, interviewed
in person between April and August 1996 by graduate students supplemented, during the
summer months, by professional interviewers from the Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan. The completion rate for the study, defined as the proportion of
interviews completed divided by the number of households listed less vacants and non-
sample households and those ineligible because of illness or language problems, was
66%. Seventy-two percent of the respondents were white, 21% were black, and 7%
some other race. Ages ranged from 18-89 with a mean age of 44 years. Respondents had
a mean of 13.5 years of education and the median income fell in the $40,000-$44,999
range.
All households were sent an advance letter before the interviewer contacted them; two
thirds of these letters contained a $5 bill and one third did not.7) Following one refusal
by anyone in the household, these two portions of the sample were again split in half.
Half of the refusers in each group--those who had received an initial incentive, and those
who had not--were sent a persuasion letter only; the other half were offered $25 to
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convert their refusal. Thus, ultimately, there were four groups of respondents, of unequal
size: Those who had been offered nothing and who had given an interview; those who
had given an interview after being offered $5; those who had given an interview after
being offered $25, and those who consented after receiving $5 and being offered $25.
Near the end of the interview, we introduced a split-ballot experiment into the survey.
After a few questions about the present survey, half the subjects in each of the four
experimental groups above were informed that because of the importance of including
everyone in the sample, some of those who had expressed reluctance to participate had
been offered $25, while others received nothing; and they were asked whether they con-
sidered this practice fair or unfair. For the other half of the sample, this piece of
information, and the question about fairness, were omitted. Then, all subjects were
asked about their willingness to take part in a future interview by the same organization.
We had expected those to whom the payment of differential incentives was disclosed to
be less willing to participate in a future survey by the same organization, because they
would consider the practice unfair. However, at the zero-order level, there were no dif-
ferences in expressed willingness to participate between the group to which differential
payments had been disclosed and the group to which it had not--about a quarter of each
group said they would "definitely" be willing to participate in another survey by the
same organization, even though a large majority--72.7%--of respondents to whom the
payment of differential incentives was disclosed considered the practice to be unfair.
We had also hypothesized that respondents to whom differential incentive payments
were disclosed and who perceived these payments to be unfair would be less willing to
participate in future surveys than those who perceived them as fair. Although a
somewhat greater percentage of those who considered the practice fair than of those who
considered it unfair were "definitely" willing to participate in a future survey by the
same organization (32.8% vs. 25.8%), this difference was not statistically significant
(X2=1.08, df=1, p<.30).
Because it seemed possible that some of the variables specified above might interact, we
estimated several logistic regression equations from the data controlling for these other
variables as well as a series of demographic characteristics. None of them altered the
basic conclusions drawn from the bivariate relationships.
A little more than a year later, all the original DAS respondents for whom we could
locate an address were sent a mailed questionnaire on the topic of assisted suicide. The
return address on the letter differed from that used for the original Detroit Area Study
survey, complicating the inferences that can be drawn from the experiment about the
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effect of concerns about equity.8) The questionnaire was preceded by an advance letter; a
random half of the respondents received a $5 prepaid incentive with the letter, whereas
the other half did not. A week after the questionnaires had been mailed, everyone in the
sample was sent a reminder postcard. We did not engage in further efforts to stimulate
the response rate.9)
The response rate to the self-administered survey was 41.4% for those who did not
receive an incentive and 65.1% for those who did--a large and statistically significant
difference. Our real interest in the study, however, was the consequence of disclosing
differential payments to respondents for their survey participation a year later. Such dis-
closure appears to have some effect on reducing participation a year later: 50% of those
to whom differential payments were disclosed participated in the new, self-administered
survey, compared with 55% to whom such payments were not disclosed, but this dif-
ference, while in the expected direction, is not statistically significant. When we looked
at the relationship between disclosure and participation in a logistic regression framework,
adding controls for receipt of an incentive in the DAS, receipt of a refusal conversion payment
offer, and a series of demographic variables, the effect of disclosure remained constant but did
not reach a conventional level of statistical significance (b=--.318, s.e.=.23, p=.17).
Are Incentives Transforming the Motivation for Survey
Participation? 10)
I come now to the last topic of the lecture: Are incentives transforming the motivation to
participate in surveys?
Because of concerns about declining cooperation rates, the Survey Research Center at
the University of Michigan decided in the fall of 1995 to begin monitoring the changing
climate for survey research in the United States by adding five evaluative questions at
the end of the Survey of Consumer Attitudes, a national telephone survey administered
monthly to a sample of roughly 500 respondents. Of these 500, 300 are newly selected
RDD households and the remaining 200 are reinterviews of respondents first
interviewed six months earlier. Because of concerns about their possible biasing effects,
the five evaluative questions were asked of only the reinterviewed portion of the sample.
The questions were added to the survey in January and February of 1996 and repeated in
February and March of 1997 in order to measure changes in the climate for survey
research over the approximately 12-month period. In principle, one could use changes in
the responses to these questions as leading indicators of changes in the climate for
survey research, and take proactive steps to counteract such changes.
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Response Rate
The analysis involves comparing two independent samples of reinterviewed respondents.
The initial response rate of those reinterviewed in January and February of 1996 was
70.3% six months earlier; their reinterview rate averaged 77.6%. Thus, the effective
response rate of the 1996 sample is 54.5%. For the sample reinterviewed in February
and March of 1997, the initial response rate averaged 69.3% and the reinterview rate,
76.8%; thus, the effective response rate for the 1997 sample was a slightly lower 53.2%.
(The response rate excludes only nonsample cases from the denominator, and is thus a
fairly conservative estimate. Noninterviews for reasons of illness or language, for
example, are retained in the denominator.) The questions are, thus, asked primarily of
cooperative respondents; presumably, the attitudes toward surveys among
nonrespondents would be more negative.
Monitoring Questions
The five monitoring questions asked on the surveys are as follows:
1. If you had it to do over again, would you have agreed to do the interview or would
you have refused?
2. For each of the following, please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree
somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly. Surveys like this one provide
useful information for decision makers?
3. Surveys like this one are a waste of people's time.
4. People should get paid for doing surveys like this.
4a. How much should they get paid?
5. Everyone has a responsibility for answering surveys like this. Do you agree strongly,
agree somewhat, etc.
The five questions were systematically rotated during their administration.
Changes over Time
As already noted, the reason for asking these questions at two points in time was to cap-
ture changes in the climate for surveys. Responses to the five questions (and one
subquestion) in 1996 and 1997 are shown in Table 4; they represent two cross-sectional
measurements of attitudes toward surveys rather than answers by the same respondents
at two different times.
Table 4 indicates that on three of the questions, no significant changes took place from
one year to the next. Three others, however, show a significant change: Significantly
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more respondents (45.7% in 1997, compared to 29.7% in 1996) said that respondents
should be paid for doing a survey like this, and the amount they stipulated showed a
significant increase as well. At the same time, significantly more respondents (51.4% in
1997, compared with 44.5% in 1996) agreed that everyone had a responsibility to
answer a survey like this.
We had anticipated changes in answers to the question about payment for two reasons.
First, the practice of paying incentives to respondents in telephone and face-to-face sur-
veys appears to be increasing, and this may be influencing expectations among the
general public. Second, a large number of respondents to the March 1997 survey had
themselves received an initial incentive payment of $5 six months earlier, and a smaller
number of respondents in three of the four months had received $20 or $25 to convert an
initial refusal.
Table 4: Responses to Evaluative Questions, by Year
1996 (%) 1997 (%)
R Should Get Paid **
Agree
Disagree
(n)
29.7
70.3
(411)
45.7
54.3
(396)
How Much *
0-5
6-10
11-20
Over 20
(n)
19.6
32.4
19.6
28.4
(102)
22.2
19.4
35.4
22.9
(144)
Surveys Are Useful
Agree Strongly
All Other
(n)
34.6
65.4
(405)
39.7
60.3
(401)
Everyone´s Responsibility *
Yes
No
(n)
44.5
55.5
(409)
51.4
48.6
(403)
Will Do Again
Yes
No
(n)
76.9
23.1
(407)
76.1
23.9
(406)
Waste of Time
Disagree Strongly 28.6 30.4
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All Other
(n)
71.4
(402)
69.6
(395)
* p <.05, **p <.01
In order to separate the effect of generalized expectations from that of personal experi-
ence, we looked at 1997 responses to the "People should get paid" question among those
who had and those who had not been offered an incentive. The results are shown in
Table 5. In both years, those who had received an incentive were much more likely to
say that people should be paid than those who had not; the differences are significant in
both years, and are especially large for people who received the (larger) refusal
conversion payments. Among people who did not receive any kind of incentive in either
year, there is a slight increase from 1996 to 1997 in the percentage saying people should
get paid for doing surveys like this, but this difference is not significant; X2=1.77, df=1,
p=.18. Nor is the difference between 1996 and 1997 among people who received a
refusal conversion payment significant. Thus, Table 5 demonstrates that the changed
expectations apparent in Table 4 are due almost entirely to the responses of those who
had themselves received an initial incentive--in other words, to personal experience
rather than diffuse social norms.
The question of interest for this paper, however, is whether these responses should be
understood as reflecting changed expectations for the future, or as normative statements
justifying past behavior.
Table 5: Responses to Evaluative Questions, by Incentive and Year
1996 1997
Incentive Incentive
0 $20-25 0 5$ $20-25
R Should Get Paid 26.0% 91.3% *** 31.0% 51.3% 77.6% ***
Surveys Are Useful 32.9% 63.6% *** 35.2% 48.7% 40.6%
Everyone’s Responsibility 44.8% 39.1% 45.7% 59.0% 58.0% *
Will Do Again 77.6% 65.2% 74.5% 83.3% 76.7%
Waste of Time (Disagree
Strongly)
26.6% 63.6% *** 30.0% 38.5% 26.5%
N (393) (23) (242) (81) (70)
* p <.10, ** p <.05, *** p<.01
We can test these alternative interpretations by examining the cooperation rate of people
to the March 1997 survey. Among people recontacted in March 1997, 139 had received
an incentive 6 months earlier and 98 had not. If the earlier payment of an incentive led
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to (unmet) expectations for payment in the future, cooperation rates (without an
additional incentive) in March should be lower among those who had received an initial
incentive the preceding September than among those who had not. However, among
those who had received an initial incentive in September and who were contacted by
interviewers, 81.0% were reinterviewed without an additional incentive in March;
among those who had received a refusal conversion incentive in September, the
cooperation rate in March without an additional incentive was 79.5%; and among those
who had received no incentive in September, the cooperation rate without an additional
incentive in March was 66.3%. The difference between those receiving no incentive in
September and those receiving $5 is significant; X2 = 5.43, df=1, p<.05; those who had
received a five dollar incentive six months earlier were significantly more likely to
cooperate in March than those who had received no incentive. The difference in March
cooperation between the no-incentive group and the group receiving a refusal conversion
payment in September is not significant. Thus, these data provide no support for the
interpretation that responses to the question about whether or not respondents should get
paid reflect expectations about future behavior on the part of the survey organization.
Summary and Conclusions
What do these investigations tell us about the anticipated and unanticipated
consequences of incentives?
1. As far as anticipated consequences are concerned, incentives appear to have similar
effects in interviewer-mediated surveys as they do in mail surveys. They increase
response rates, even for low-burden surveys. They do not appear to have adverse effects
on the quality of response, although they may alter the composition of the sample. Con-
clusions about the effects of framing await further testing, but results so far suggest they
are relatively unimportant.
2. As far as unintended consequences are concerned, the evidence is more ambiguous.
Our research suggests that equity matters to respondents, but it is not a very salient issue
for them. Thus, although large majorities consider the practice of paying refusal conver-
sion payments unfair, awareness of this practice does not seem to loom large in their
expressed willingness to participate in future research by the same organization or in
their actual participation a year later. Nor does the payment of incentives at the outset of
a survey appear to have negative consequences for participation in a second wave of the
same survey without additional incentives. On the contrary, people who received such an
incentive six months earlier were actually more likely to cooperate than those who did
not. However, payment of incentives is still a rather novel experience for respondents to
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telephone or personal interviews. Whether the absence of negative results observed in
the present study will survive the more widespread use of incentives in such interviews
remains very much an open question, and one deserving continued research.
3. The general conclusion, therefore, should come as no surprise. Although we have not
so far seen evidence that the payment of incentives, either to some or to all respondents,
has dramatic unintended consequences, we cannot rule out the possibility of such effects
in the future. Nor can we be sure that the effects would be the same in countries with
different cultural norms about equitable treatment and payment for survey participation.
Therefore, experiments along the lines reported here should be carried out in other coun-
tries, and we should continue to monitor attitudes toward surveys both in the U.S. and in
other countries where surveys are routinely carried out and increasingly relied on by
governments, businesses, and academics.
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Notes
*) Anmerkung des Herausgebers: Der Beitrag ist die überarbeitete Fassung einer
Vorlesung, die Eleanor Singer im Rahmen der Wildenmann-Gastprofessur bei ZUMA
hielt.
1) A fuller report of the research in this section will appear as Singer et al., „The
Effects of Incentives on Response Rates in Face-to-Face and Telephone Surveys“, in a
forthcoming issue of the Journal of Official Statistics. We would like to thank the
anonymous reviewers of that journal, as well as associate editor Nancy Mathiowetz, for
their helpful comments.
2) A handful of letters were returned as undeliverable. These did not cluster in any one
experimental condition, and are included in the denominator.
3) As noted earlier, some students selected for the sample lived in the same dormitory.
As a precaution, we asked, in the course of the telephone survey, whether or not the
respondent knew anyone who had been selected for the survey. Eighty respondents--
16.2% of the interviewed sample, and 12.8% of the original sample--claimed they did.
When the responses of these students are excluded, the attitudinal results do not change
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in any important way. We cannot, of course, analyze the effect of this variable on
participation in the survey.
4) We stipulated that interviewers were to call back at least 4 times, at different times
of the day and on different days, and to make one attempt to convert refusals by those
who had not returned the card.
5) In a mail survey, follow-up mailings would serve a similar function.
6) What is considered „equitable“ today may, as a result of exposure to different
practices, come to be perceived as „inequitable“ in the future, and vice versa. Thus, the
practices of some organizations with respect to incentives may affect the climate in
which all surveys are carried out. We return to this topic below.
7) Households who received the $5 incentive were significantly more likely to respond
than those who did not; the difference in response rates was 8 percentage points.
8) The questionnaire and the return address on letters identified the research
organization as the Program on Public Opinion and Health Policy at the Survey Research
Center, University of Michigan. Hence, respondents may not have identified the mail
survey with the organization that had interviewed them more than a year earlier.
9) The number of respondents to the original Detroit Area Study was 451; the follow-up
request was sent to 433 of those respondents (18 respondents were omitted because we
were unable to locate an address for them). Completed questionnaires were returned by
202 respondents, 4 respondents refused to participate, and 172 respondents did not
return questionnaires; 53 questionnaires were undeliverable, and 2 respondents were
deceased or could not be contacted for other reasons.  The completion rate, as defined
earlier, was 53.4%.
10) For a fuller discussion of the research reported here, see Eleanor Singer, John Van
Hoewyk, and Patricia Maher, Does the Payment of Incentives Create Expectation
Effects? Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1998. We would like to thank Vincent Price
and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the manuscript.
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